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Abstract: This policy study critically compares two different efforts to implement an accountability 
system in the New York City public schools. In 1971, the New York City Board of Education 
contracted with the Educational Testing Service (ETS), which created a lengthy accountability plan 
for the district. Fitful maneuvers to execute the ETS plan fizzled out by 1978. Roughly three decades 
later, New York City educational leaders publicly championed school accountability as a chief goal. 
By 2003, formal accountability system planning had commenced; in 2007, an accountability system 
went fully operational, with New York City public schools receiving a published letter grade that 
ranged from A-F. This study demonstrates how the maturation of a national education policy 
paradigm (standards-based school accountability) coalesced with several contextual factors (money, 
power, principals, and public relations) to enable successful system implementation in the 2000s. 
Importantly, this work also demonstrates how African-American community representatives and 
leaders in New York City contributed to the nascent movement for accountability in the 1970s, yet 
the voices of underrepresented and underserved populations were largely absent in the 2000s 
implementation effort. Finally, events in both eras illustrate how educational accountability can play 
an important symbolic role by transmitting political messages. 
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Paradigmas, poder y relaciones públicas en Nueva York: Evaluando la implementación de 
dos modelos rendición de cuentas escolares. 
Resumen: Este estudio compara la política dos modelos diferentes de implementación de sistemas 
de rendición de cuentas en escuelas públicas de Nueva York. En 1971, la Junta de Educación de la 
Ciudad de Nueva York contrató el Educational Testing Service (ETS), que creó un plan de 
responsabilidad para el distrito. Maniobras intermitentes para ejecutar el plan de ETS  concluyeron 
en 1978. Casi tres décadas más tarde, los líderes educativos de la ciudad de Nueva York defendieron 
públicamente la rendición de cuentas escolar como un objetivo fundamental. Para el 2003, la 
planificación formal del sistema de rendición de cuentas había comenzado; en 2007, un sistema de 
rendición de cuentas entró en pleno funcionamiento, y las escuelas públicas de la ciudad de Nueva 
York reciben una calificación que va de A-F. Este estudio demuestra cómo la maduración de un 
paradigma de la política educativa nacional (basado en los estándares de rendición de cuentas 
escolars) se unieron con varios factores contextuales (dineroel poder, directores y relaciones 
públicas) para permitir la implementación del sistema en la década de 2000. Es importante destacar 
que este trabajo también demuestra cómo los representantes de la comunidad afro-americanos y 
líderes en Nueva York contribuyeron al naciente movimiento de rendición de cuentas en la década 
de 1970, sin embargo, las voces de poblaciones insuficientemente representadas e insuficientemente 
atendidas siguieron en gran medida ausentes en el esfuerzo de implementación del año 2000. Por 
último, los acontecimientos en ambas épocas ilustran cómo modelos de rendición de cuentas 
escolares puede desempeñar un papel simbólico importante para transmitir mensajes políticos.  
Palabras clave: rendición de cuentas; política educativa; educación urbana 
 
Paradigmas, poder e relações públicas em Nova Iorque: Avaliar a implementação de dois 
modelos de prestação de contas da escola.  
Resumo: Este estudo compara dois modelos diferentes de implementação de políticas de sistemas 
de prestação de contas nas escolas públicas de Nova York. Em 1971, o Conselho de Educação da 
Cidade de Nova York comtratou o Educational Testing Service (ETS), que criou um plano de 
prestação de contas para o distrito. Plano intermitente para executar manobras ETS concluiu em 
1978. Quase três décadas depois, os líderes educacionais da cidade de Nova Iorque defendeuram 
publicamente a prestação de contas das escolas como um objectivo fundamental. Para 2003, a 
prestação de contas do sistema de planejamento formal tinha começado; em 2007, um sistema de 
prestação de contas tornou-se plenamente operacional, e as escolas públicas da cidade de Nova York 
receberam uma nota entre A-F. Este estudo demonstra como a maturação de um paradigma da 
política nacional de educação (relatórios baseados em prestação de contas) juntou-se a vários fatores 
contextuais (poder, dinheiro, gerentes e relações públicas) para permitir a implementação do sistema 
no início 2000 É importante ressaltar que este trabalho também mostra como os representantes dos 
líderes da comunidade afro-americana de Nova York contribuiu para o aumento da circulação de 
responsabilização na década de 1970, no entanto, as vozes das populações sub-representadas e 
carentes seguido praticamente ausente no esforço de implementação de 2000 Finalmente, eventos 
em ambos os modelos épocas ilustrar como a prestação de contas da escola pode desempenhar um 
papel simbólico importante para transmitir mensagens políticas.  
Palavras-chave: prestação de contas; política educacional; educação urbana 





Previous scholars have examined the past in order to help make meaning of urban 
education’s present (Cuban, 2010; Ravitch, 2000; Shipps, 2006). In this spirit, this study investigates 
two attempts, occurring roughly thirty years apart, to implement a school-focused accountability 
system in the New York City (NYC) public schools. First, in 1969, the politically appointed NYC 
Board of Education (BOE) formed a working school accountability committee that included a wide 
range of district stakeholder representatives. By January 1971, the NYC BOE signed a contract with 
the Educational Testing Service (ETS) based in Princeton, New Jersey (Buder, 1971a). In June 1972, 
ETS produced a lengthy accountability plan for the district (McDonald, 1972). After several years of 
fitful progress toward initiating the plan, in 1976, reports surfaced that “fiscal pressures” had 
“delayed…implementation” of the system (Maeroff, 1976, p. 182). Signaling the original plan’s 
apparent demise, upon taking over as the NYC BOE’s new Chancellor (equivalent to district 
superintendent) in 1978, Frank Macchiarola explained, “I want to get an accountability system that 
works” (Chambers, 1978a, p. 1).  
Twenty-four years later in 2002, newly elected New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
was granted control of the school system, when the New York State legislature took supervisory 
powers away from the Board of Education. Bloomberg opened a new Department of Education 
(DOE) under his direct supervision. Mayors had no direct control over the Board of Education 
since “six different elected officials” [including the mayor] made appointments to the seven seats 
(Ravitch, 2009, p. 183). The Board of Education was replaced by the Panel for Educational Policy, a 
body to which the mayor appointed the majority of members and was “widely perceived as a rubber 
stamp for decisions made by the chancellor and mayor” (Ravitch, 2009, p. 184). Upon appointing 
Joel Klein as the school system chancellor in July 2002, Bloomberg described the school district as, 
“an organization that has not been accountable to anybody” (Steinhauer, 2002a, p. B4). Within five 
years of the Mayor’s pronouncement, the DOE had developed, piloted, and then fully implemented 
an accountability system in which each public school citywide received a published A-F letter grade 
based predominantly on student test score growth (Shipps, 2012). Importantly, a school’s grade 
would also be used as an essential part of each principal’s yearly evaluation, ensuring personal 
professional responsibility was attached to school results.  
These two contrasting accountability policy initiatives provoke this study’s central animating 
question: why did the implementation of a New York City public school accountability system fail in the 1970s yet 
succeed in the 2000s? In answering this question, I first provide a brief history of accountability and 
urban school reform since the 1960s. I next detail the two different attempts to implement a New 
York City school accountability system. Using archival materials, policy documents, and newspaper 
accounts, I illustrate how and why the 1970s accountability system encountered numerous obstacles 
that stymied actual implementation. Subsequently, I reference media sources, policy documents, and 
emerging scholarship to describe why the 2000s accountability system moved relatively swiftly from 
design to implementation.           
On one level, the 2000s implementation effort benefited from a reigning national policy 
paradigm that privileged the employment of tough bureaucratic accountability mechanisms for 
educators (Mehta, 2013). On another level, specific, definable elements help explain the failure of 
one New York City accountability system implementation and success of another three decades 
later. The contextual factors that enabled implementation of the 2000s system included: a more 
favorable budget climate; changed district authority and city socio-political dynamics; an open, 
intensive focus on school-based leaders as ultimately responsible for school performance; and more 
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effective district communication and message control operations. In essence, a new national policy 
paradigm (educational accountability) and four crucial contextual factors (money, power, principals, 
and PR) allowed the 2000s accountability system to be implemented successfully. 
This study adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, it describes the interplay 
between a grand policy paradigm and several political and contingent considerations, and analyzes 
how these forces affected the pursuit of educational accountability system implementation. In 
addition, this study provides empirical insight into what Mehta (2013) called “the now almost 
forgotten accountability efforts of the 1960s and 1970s” (p. 65). Importantly, this work also 
demonstrates in particular how African-American community representatives and leaders in New 
York City contributed to the nascent movement for accountability in the 1970s, yet the voices of 
underrepresented and underserved populations were largely absent in the 2000s implementation 
effort. Finally, events in both eras illustrate how educational accountability can play an important 
symbolic role by transmitting political messages. 
Accountability and Urban School Reform: A Brief History 
 Over the past four decades, K-12 education in the United States has witnessed increased 
attention to educational accountability in its “bureaucratic” form, which is constituted by “rewarding 
and punishing outcomes” defined as “student performance measured by achievement tests” 
(Firestone & Shipps, 2005, p. 86). The ascension of educational accountability as the prevailing US 
school policy paradigm progressed in two discernible stages since the 1960s: an incipient period in 
the 1960s and 1970s and a full maturation phase spanning from 1983 to today (Mehta, 2013).1 The 
1966 release of the Coleman report, which found that schools had limited effects in terms of 
overcoming students’ socioeconomic backgrounds, provided an initial spark for the accountability 
movement (Mehta, 2013; Ravitch, 2002; Spencer, 2012). By considering school outcomes (academic 
achievement scores) rather than inputs (salaries, facilities, etc.), the report established a new means 
for considering school and, by proxy, educator quality (Mehta, 2013; Ravitch, 2002). In addition, 
during this period the influence of business ideas in education grew, which helped encourage greater 
attention to numerical performance and bottom-line objectives in schools (Lewis, 2013; Mehta, 
2013; Spencer, 2012). 
By the 1960s, some of the first accountability systems began to appear. Pennsylvania’s 
legislature approved annual achievement testing in 1963; due to the complexity of the design 
process, actual testing began in 1969 (Wynne, 1972). In the 1970s, the Michigan Department of 
Education instituted a “six-step accountability model, which linked testing, standards, and school 
improvement in one package” (Mehta, 2013, p. 80). Suggesting political difficulties, the state’s 
teachers’ union successfully impeded “linking…tests to the broader ambition of improving schools” 
(Mehta, 2013, p. 81). Assessing the development of state level accountability systems over time, one 
researcher demonstrated how state assessments had transformed from performing a localized 
student guidance function to, in the 1970s and beyond, an educator accountability function. This 
accountability function eventually became, by the 1980s, a public means of rewarding and 
sanctioning schools and personnel (Mazzeo, 2001). 
With its dire depiction of American schools in dangerous decline, A Nation at Risk propelled 
widespread interest in holding schools accountable for student, community, and national 
improvement (Mehta, 2013). Two decades later, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) was 
                                                
1 Though the time period is not germane to my study, Mehta (2013) situates the first accountability effort 
amidst the Progressive Era of the early 1900s. 
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signed into law by President George W. Bush in early 2002.2 Relevant studies have depicted the 
political maneuvering and contextual factors necessary to pass NCLB (McGuinn, 2006; Vinovskis, 
2009). Illustratively, Jaiani and Whitford (2011) demonstrated how, early in its tenure, the Bush 
administration seized a unique opportunity (a policy window) by building a bi-partisan coalition 
whose differences were many but whose common interests coalesced around the goal of improving 
schools through accountability. By 2001, then, accountability for student academic performance had 
emerged as a prevailing paradigm that proved irresistible to policymakers (Mehta, 2013). Under the 
accountability policy logic as it has matured, external agents (most notably elected state officials and 
their states’ departments of education) hold educators responsible for student academic 
performance as reflected in quantitative, test-based outcomes. NCLB, with its yearly performance 
accounting and corresponding state-level school sanctioning mechanics, stood as testimony to the 
national triumph of the accountability idea (Mehta, 2013).   
  Educational accountability—in various forms—has been an essential part of the struggle to 
improve urban schools since the 1960s. In cities such as Newark, New Jersey, Austin, Texas, 
Chicago, Oakland, and Philadelphia, parents and community advocates pursued various strategies 
(from integration demands to grassroots protest organizing) in efforts to make educational 
professionals more responsive to their concerns (Anyon, 1997; Cuban, 2010; Shipps, 2006; Spencer, 
2012). In late 1960s New York City, a burgeoning community control movement met stiff educator 
resistance in places like Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Disputes over school control and resulting teachers’ 
strikes generated deep-seated distrust between predominantly African-American and Latino parents 
and mostly White, Jewish-American educational professionals (Perlstein, 2004; Podair, 2002). An 
African-American community activist and parent leader of an experimental school in Harlem 
explained in 1969: 
Are teachers afraid to be held accountable for their performance? We believe that in 
most communities, teachers are, in fact, accountable for the achievement of their 
students. We are demanding the same protections for our children that other 
communities already exercise. (Lewis, 2013, p. 26) 
While Mehta (2013) asserted that “only state departments of education saw educational 
accountability as a priority” (p. 76) during the 1960s and 1970s, African-Americans and other urban 
community members, advocates, and educational professionals contributed directly to efforts to 
enact bureaucratic accountability systems in the schools of major cities. From 1970 to 1972, the 
Washington D.C. public schools implemented an Academic Achievement Plan, which was intended 
to raise the academic performance of African-American children in the segregated district. Designed 
by renowned psychologist Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, the Plan emphasized basic skills and intended to 
evaluate educators based on students’ test scores (Cuban, 1974). Clark had gained notoriety in 1954 
when his research on children, dolls, and race played a major role in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brown 
v. Board of Education decision. He spent the next decades endeavoring to improve urban living 
conditions and schooling (Keppel, 2002). D.C.’s Academic Achievement Plan floundered and 
ultimately failed as key players, including Clark, the school board president, the superintendent, and 
teachers union president (all of whom were African-American) battled over “control of the reform 
in the schools” (Cuban, 1974, p. 16). As described below, Clark also played a prominent role in New 
York City’s 1970s accountability system deliberations. In addition, in the 1960s and 1970s, African-
American principal and, later, superintendent Marcus Foster made accountability for academic 
                                                
2 Though much of the legislative action leading to passage and adoption of the No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB) of 2001 occurred in late 2001, President Bush actually signed NCLB into law on January 8, 2002. See 
Bumiller (2002).  
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results a central element of his efforts to improve schools in Philadelphia and Oakland (Spencer, 
2012). As Spencer (2012) explained,  
the ethos of accountability (if not the exact form it has taken) is …a legacy of racial 
liberalism and civil rights activism…especially since the late 1960s. Foster and others 
of his era promoted an urgent, “no excuses” mentality, as they shifted the focus of 
public discourse from the alleged deficiencies of urban students to those of the 
schools. (p. 228) 
More recently, bureaucratic accountability has been a central aspect of the school reform efforts in 
New York City. Under Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein, the district progressed from an 
initial top-down control structure toward employing a portfolio management model that provided 
principals autonomy in exchange for greater accountability (Gyurko & Henig, 2010). While some 
authors have provided academic assessments of various reforms instituted under this organizational 
approach (e.g., O’Day, Bitter, & Gomez, 2011), others have condemned what they portrayed as the 
democracy-debilitating business style of Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein’s change efforts 
(Ravitch, 2010). Others have enumerated problems created by the top-down implementation 
approach (Rogers, 2009). Importantly, principals, who emerged as key actors in both accountability 
approaches, have seen their work lives directly affected by the successful implementation of the 
2000s system. In one study, many principals reported feeling “beleaguered” rather than 
“empowered” by the autonomy and accountability reforms that made them the center of district 
improvement efforts (Shipps, 2012).  
Conceptualizing Accountability and Urban School Reform 
This study synthesizes existing literature in proposing its conceptual framework and devising 
an interpretive lens for understanding the deeper meanings of its findings. In regard to the 
conceptual framework, I employ insights regarding policy adoption and implementation described 
by Mehta (2013). First, Mehta (2013) defined “policy paradigm” as a “problem definition” that “has 
triumphed and assumes the status of a master narrative,” and represents “dominant views that 
preclude significant dissent” (p. 19). In this sense, policy paradigms are ideas that have developed 
over time into powerful forces for change. A paradigm can “shape politics” since it “changes the nature 
of the debate,” “changes the constellation of actors,” and may “create an opportunity for major institutional change” 
[all italics original] (Mehta, 2013, pp. 18-20). Applying these concepts to New York City, the 
inchoate status of standards-based accountability as a policy idea in the 1970s limited the potential 
for system implementation. When Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein assumed leadership, 
however, a paradigm shift had occurred toward a national embrace of standards-based 
accountability. In essence, the establishment of the standards-based school accountability paradigm 
by the 2000s offered the proper policy climate necessary to encourage successful implementation.  
Mehta (2013) also explained that there were “more immediate considerations,” such as 
political concessions and national solidarity forged by the aftermath of 9/11, that helped ensure 
adoption of NCLB (p. 239). He labeled these actions and events “strategic and contingent shorter-
term factors” (p. 240). Using Mehta’s definitions as a starting point, I employ the term contextual 
factors to describe the political realities and real world dynamics that helped determine the fate of 
accountability policy implementation in New York City. In the end, there were four contextual 
factors relevant to efforts to implement an accountability system in both eras:  
• Money—School reform is typically expensive and, at times, profitable (Cuban, 
2004). Implementing reforms requires either reallocation of existing funds or 
allocating new funds, so healthy budgets and supplemental financial support 
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from outside agencies become a necessity for enabling successful reform 
implementation.    
• Power—The history of urban school reform can be framed as, in significant part, 
an intense power struggle among diverse political actors and groups who seek 
divergent outcomes (Anyon, 1997; Payne, 2008; Perlstein, 2004; Podair, 2002; 
Ravitch, 2000). Establishing systemic accountability within an urban school 
district amounts to a battle over who will hold whom responsible for what kinds 
of educational results.  
• Principals—Bureaucratic accountability systems make professional educators 
responsible for student outcomes (Firestone & Shipps, 2005). Therefore, 
accountability systems must have a person to shoulder blame in order to signify 
the potent professional consequences of educational failure. Due to their role-
based prominence as school leaders and (by the 2000s) their lack of tenure-based 
job security protections, New York City principals made inviting targets for 
accountability consequences (Peck & Mullen, 2010).  
• PR—Press and public relations emerged as an important concern in the 1970s. 
Today, managing a district’s core messages is an essential consideration in 
modern urban school management (Carr, 2013). 
Drawing from Mehta (2013), then, this study’s conceptual framework holds that a policy paradigm 
(standards-based accountability) and four contextual factors (money, power, principals, and PR) 
played vital roles in determining the success or failure of accountability system implementation.   
In my discussion section below, I consider and invoke findings from the study of school 
reform as an interpretive lens. First, as reflected in the titles of Cuban (1990) (“Reforming Again, 
Again, and Again”) and Hess (2010) (The Same Thing Over and Over), forgotten, failed, or neglected 
reform ideas tend to reappear with new names attached. Second, I consider studies such as 
Anderson (2007), Goldstein (2011), and Smith, Miller-Kahn, Heinecke, and Jarvis (2004) that have 
examined the role rhetoric and symbols play in educational policy. Of particular note, Lipman 
(2002), in her study of Chicago, explained that “accountability polices…are a form of symbolic 
politics,” in that they “shape public definition of education, explain educational failure, and organize 
consciousness around shared understandings of what constitutes legitimate classroom knowledge, 
educational practice, and valorized social identities” (p. 394). Similarly, Mazzeo (2001) contended, 
“accountability testing provides politicians with a highly visible symbol of action, while also offering 
at least some leverage to shape and change what educators do and how the system is run” (p. 390). 
Two Attempts to Implement a School Accountability System: An Overview 
Two separate efforts to implement school accountability systems in New York City resulted 
in different outcomes. In 1969, a new labor agreement between the Board of Education of the City 
of New York (BOE) and the teachers’ union, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), included an 
important codicil recognizing the school system professionals’ “failure to educate all of our 
students” and the concomitant need “to develop objective criteria of professional accountability” 
(BOE and UFT, 1969, p. 1). In addition, representatives from the city’s traditionally underserved 
African-American and Latino communities agitated for the idea that professional educators should 
be held responsible for the academic results of students (Lewis, 2013; Wynne, 1972). By early 1970 
the BOE had initiated an Accountability Committee with representatives from a range of 
constituencies, including individuals from the Board of Education, the teachers’ and principals’ 
unions, parent associations, and universities. Contests eventually occurred over who should and 
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could gain representative access on the body, with the Chancellor in 1971 “adding five additional 
representatives of the black and Puerto Rican community” (No Author, n.d., p. 1).  
In June 1970, the City University of New York organized a conference in Tarrytown, New 
York, during which representatives from the Accountability Committee and other invited guests 
heard accountability experts such as Henry S. Dyer of the Princeton, New Jersey-based Educational 
Testing Service (ETS) explain the basic mechanics of school accountability systems and functions 
(CUNY, 1970). A 1971 BOE contract with ETS resulted in the production of an over-240 page 
document titled, “A Design for an Accountability System for the New York City School System” 
(McDonald, 1972).  
The design document explained that the proposed accountability system would have “three 
characteristics”: 
 (1) the system will provide data on students’ achievement so that judgments about 
the adequacy of their performance may be made; (2) the system will provide a way of 
assessing the causes of deficiencies in the students’ performances; (3) the system will 
provide a way of taking corrective action to remove these deficiencies. (McDonald, 
1972, p. S5) 
Under the plan’s logic, the accountability system would identify schools that were “doing better for 
their students than are other schools” (McDonald, 1972, p. S13). Better schools would be examined 
to identify “process variables” that had allowed their children to succeed (McDonald, 1972, p. S15). 
Meanwhile, underperforming schools would undergo a “process of determining the causes of the 
deficiencies in students” (McDonald, 1972, p. S18). Underperforming schools would then develop a 
“Planning and Operations Committee” that included educators and, possibly, parents that would 
create the school’s “corrective action plan” (McDonald, 1972, p. S20).    
Importantly, under the ETS plan schools were the unit of accountability; the plan did not 
ascribe responsibility for student performance directly to teachers and administrators. ETS’s Dyer 
had in fact called the grade equivalency tests that NYC and other systems were using to determine 
students’ reading grade levels “psychological and statistical monstrosities” unfit for determining 
“professional accountability” (Stevens, 1971a, p. 19).3 Instead, the ETS accountability system was 
“designed to assess and analyze the problems of individual schools” (McDonald, 1972, S2). Rather 
than a consequence-bearing letter grade or other signifier of high-stakes accountability for 
performance, low-performing schools received a “Corrective-Action Plan” that would be “a matter 
of public record” (McDonald, 1972, pp. S22-S23).  
After a series of delays, the Board of Education approved the ETS plan in April 1974 
(Buder, 1974b). By 1976, the BOE had hired an accountability program director, Senior Assistant to 
the Chancellor Charles I. Schonhaut, who instituted field tests based on the ETS plan at over 60 
elementary schools (Accountability Committee, 1977). Despite these forward steps and the apparent 
consensus regarding the need for greater school accountability, full implementation of the ETS 
accountability system never occurred. Notes from a July 31, 1978, Accountability Committee 
meeting revealed that, at the request of the new Chancellor Frank Macchiarola, the initiative’s name 
was changed to School Improvement Project. Moreover, as a pilot program, it would receive no 
publicity (Accountability Project Staff, 1978). Schonhaut, meanwhile, was transferred to the position 
of executive director of special education soon after Macchiarola became Chancellor (Chambers, 
                                                
3 New York State had instituted required “uniform objective achievement exams…to all pupils in grades 
three, six, and nine” by 1966. The basic reporting system allowed for comparisons among geographic areas 
and “individual schools within communities,” but there was no data on “socioeconomic status of students” 
(Wynne, 1972, p. 76). 
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1978b). The ETS accountability plan, initially proposed in 1970, contracted for production in 1971, 
produced in 1972, and BOE-approved in 1974, was effectively dead by summer 1978. 
Two-and-a-half decades later in 2002, Mayor Bloomberg chose Joel Klein as his chancellor. 
Klein had no previous experience as a professional educator, and was best known for his role 
leading anti-trust litigation against Microsoft while serving as an attorney general with the U.S. 
Justice Department (Ravitch, 2010). Klein and an elite cadre of Department of Education (DOE) 
reformers sought fundamental changes in school governance, including how the schools, educators, 
and even the system itself would be held responsible for student performance. Early on, high-profile 
policy actions constituted explicit symbols of significant change. First, the Mayor’s victory in 
securing control of the schools meant that he owned the problem, so to speak, and could not simply 
blame the Board of Education for school failings as previous mayors had done (Steinhauer, 2002b). 
Second, the new administration announced plans to close Brooklyn’s 110 Livingston Street, the 
legendary bureaucratic heart of the former Board of Education (Rogers, 1968; Steinhauer, 2002b). 
Instead, the new, Mayoral-controlled DOE would be housed in downtown Manhattan in a 
refurbished Tweed Hall, a historical building located directly behind City Hall (Steinhauer, 2002b). 
The proximity of the Mayor’s Office and Department of Education signaled that reforming the 
schools would be a top priority of the Bloomberg administration.  
 In conjunction with these well-publicized reforms, Chancellor Klein and his administration 
emphasized the need to bring more accountability to the system. Initial targets of their 
accountability-focused talk and actions were principals. In January 2003, the public learned through 
newspaper articles that the Chancellor had developed performance-based individual report cards for 
principals, and that “at least 50…received failing marks” (Medina, 2003, p. B2). These fifty failing 
grades aligned with a previous Klein promise to remove fifty low performing principals at the end of 
the school year. A DOE spokesperson explained, “We’ve said all along that we are going to hold 
them accountable. This is one piece of a whole system of measuring” (Medina, 2003, p. B2). Mayor 
Bloomberg added, “You’ll either do the job, or if we can’t help you with better tools and better 
training, you’re just going to have to work elsewhere” (Medina, 2003, p. B2). 
Following this initial focus on holding principals publicly responsible for school 
performance, in late 2003 Klein announced efforts to develop an accountability system that would 
help address the fact that “we don’t have very good measures or metrics” in education 
(Herszenhorn, 2003, p. B2). Central animating questions of the accountability system, he explained, 
included, “How do I reinforce those who are doing well and make sure they get the recognition? 
How do I support or ultimately terminate those who are not?” (Herszenhorn, 2003, p. B2). After 
initial planning began in 2003, in 2005 Klein selected a legal scholar to lead an accountability design 
effort that included significant input and activity from professional consultants (Childress, Higgins, 
Ishimaru, & Takahashi, 2011; Gyurko & Henig, 2010). In fall 2006, the accountability system piloted 
and, by fall 2007, it was in place citywide (Gootman, 2006; Medina, 2007).  
Under the accountability system, individual schools received “A-F” letter grades denoting 
progress, measured predominantly through student growth on New York State standardized 
examinations. Importantly, the letter grades came with real sanctions attached, in the form of 
possible school closures as well as principal replacements at “F” and “D” schools (Gootman & 
Medina, 2007a). Chancellor Klein called it, “the best system for evaluating schools in the country” 
(Gootman & Medina, 2007a, p. A1). Interestingly, the 2000s New York City school accountability 
system actually supplemented an existing No Child Left Behind-mandated New York State 
accountability system that invoked school sanctions based on test-score performance and other 
indicators (Hemphill & Nauer, 2010). 
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Explaining Accountability System Implementation Failure or Success  
Why did the implementation of a New York City public school accountability system fail in 
the 1970s yet succeed in the 2000s? On one level, in the 1970s educational accountability was still a 
nascent idea. Suggestive of this developmental period, a 1970 issue of Phi Delta Kappan was devoted 
to examining the new trend of accountability, and included an explanation of the New York City 
accountability plan written by Henry S. Dyer of ETS (Dyer, 1970b). The issue’s guest editor, Myron 
Lieberman of the City University of New York, served on the BOE’s Accountability Committee 
(Lieberman, 1970). In this sense, the 1970s accountability system implementation effort occurred as 
a noteworthy part of an emergent yet still contested policy idea. By the 2000s, however, standards-
based educational accountability had matured into a policy paradigm, as reflected in the adoption of 
NCLB (Mehta, 2013). As noted earlier, the New York City accountability system actually 
supplemented a state-level accountability system (Hemphill & Nauer, 2010). By the mid-2000s, then, 
the time was right in New York City for accountability system adoption and implementation. 
Besides the arrival of a fitting ideational context, there were also contextual factors that 
determined system implementation success or failure. Based on the accumulated data there are four 
discernible considerations: city budget realities, prevailing power dynamics, the organizational status 
and role of principals, and district communication and message control operations. In shorthand, 
the relevant contextual factors were money, power, principals, and PR. I begin by discussing how 
the city’s financial situation affected both accountability system development and implementation. 
Money 
In the early 1970s, economic woes and a budget crisis shocked the city and its schools, 
frustrating accountability system development and implementation throughout most of the decade. 
For instance, in February 1971, at a major press conference attended by representatives of the Board 
of Education (BOE), the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the Council of Supervisors and 
Administrators (CSA), and parents groups, the Board announced that it had contracted $100,000 
with Princeton, New Jersey’s Educational Testing Service to design an accountability system for the 
schools (Buder, 1971a). Financial reality soon intruded. In March 1971, the school board reported it 
was $40 million short of funds necessary for the remainder of the school year (Madden, 1971). 
Suggesting how these financial events affected the accountability effort, a letter from the school 
system’s head, Chancellor Scribner, to the BOE Accountability Committee apologized that their 
April 22, 1971, meeting “had to be abruptly cancelled because of the Press Conference by the Board 
of Education on the Budget Crisis” (Scribner, 1971, p. 1).  
The accountability effort did proceed, and ETS provided its design documents in June 1972 
(McDonald, 1972). The design document predicted costs of over $200,000 for initial accountability 
system pilot testing in 62 schools and $1.2 million per year once the accountability system was in 
place citywide (McDonald, 1972). Pilot testing involving a couple schools drawn from each of the 
city’s 32 decentralized districts, was not initially announced until fall 1974 (Buder, 1974b). By fall 
1975, the head of the Accountability program, Charles I. Schonhaut, was in place, though the pilot 
test was still delayed. The lack of necessary start-up funding was discussed as a primary concern 
during an Accountability Committee meeting in October 1975 (Cooper, 1975). Without district 
financial support forthcoming, Schonhaut sought funding from the Ford Foundation for the 
accountability system. He explained in a letter to the foundation, “Not only don’t we have the 
system, we don’t even have sufficient funds to begin implementing it” (Schonhaut, 1975). The curt 
rejection notice explained, “Our restricted financial condition…prevents our helping with activities 
which have been started and dropped by governmental or other organizations” (Bohrson, 1975). By 
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fall 1975, the city itself was in such dire economic straits that the New York Daily News exclaimed in a 
notoriously misleading front-page headline that President Ford told the city to “drop dead” when it 
requested federal emergency funding (Roberts, 2006). It is little wonder that a fall 1976 New York 
Times report explained that financial issues continued to delay the implementation of the 
accountability system (Maeroff, 1976). 
The economic portrait was far different two-and-a-half decades later. After 2002, the New 
York City Department of Education (DOE) benefited from three financial developments. First, 
according to Stiefel and Schwartz (2011), from 2002-08, overall total spending in the school district 
increased by over $5 billion (p. 64) while per-pupil spending increased by almost $5000 (p. 80). In 
addition, the city, in the years immediately preceding the 2008 Great Recession, benefited from a 
robust economy with strong tax revenues (Wolf, 2011). These two developments contrast notably 
with conditions in the 1970s, when city budget strains severely impacted the schools. Finally, the 
Klein administration benefited from substantial contributions from private sources for schooling 
initiatives; once a program was established, costs could be transferred to the DOE budget (Gyurko 
& Henig, 2010; Ravitch, 2010; Stiefel & Schwartz, 2011). New York City’s Independent Budget 
Office (IBO) explained, “Some accountability costs were initially covered with private funding, but 
these same costs are now increasingly being paid with city dollars” (Smith, 2008, p. 1). Thanks to the 
healthy budgetary context as well as access to private start-up funding, the DOE could absorb the 
expense of a school accountability system that the IBO determined an actual  cost of over $60 
million for 2007 and estimated a cost of nearly $130 million for 2008 (Smith, 2008).  
A second difference between the two eras involved school governance and power. 
Power 
In the 1960s through the 1970s, the decades-old New York City school system was 
embroiled in sustained conflict. Tensions rose as the professional interests of the predominantly 
White, Jewish-American teachers and administrators who staffed the schools confronted the 
personal interests and protest actions of the African-Americans and Latinos whose children 
attended the schools (Lewis, 2013; Perlstein, 2004; Podair, 2002; Wasserman, 1970). At the core of 
these disputes was a contest over power: who controlled the schools, professional educators or local 
communities? In a politically compromised effort to provide more community control of education 
while maintaining employment protections favored by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the 
state sanctioned the ambiguously-defined “decentralization” of the New York City K-8 schools in 
1969. Decentralization established 32 separate districts with boards elected by local communities. 
High schools remained under direct control of the central NYC Board of Education (Lewis, 2013).  
Under this new arrangement, the politically appointed NYC Board of Education and the 
Chancellor it selected effectively shared power with the 32 districts that operated with varying 
degrees of independence and authority (Lewis, 2013; Ravitch, 2009). Three different Chancellors 
served as system heads from 1970 to 1978, which suggests how the governance structure presented 
a challenge for district leaders. Moreover, the UFT asserted its powerful influence by executing 
several system-wide strikes during the 1960s and 1970s, while the Council of Supervisors and 
Administrators (CSA) regularly and forcefully asserted the rights of school principals and assistant 
principals. Ravitch (2000) likened the situation to a “hydra-headed school system in which authority 
was so broadly diffused that no one could be held accountable for its performance” (p. xxii).   
The original accountability effort, then, was subject to attenuated central governance 
capacities as well as complex sociopolitical and racial tensions. Reflecting the prevailing impulse 
toward increased democratic involvement, the BOE’s Accountability Committee pursued designing 
and enacting the accountability system by including a variety of stakeholders in its deliberations. 
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Initiated in 1969, the Committee originally included representatives from the Board of Education, 
community school boards, the Chancellor’s office, the UFT, the CSA, and parent organizations (No 
Author, n.d.). Of these groups, the UFT, perhaps the most potent, unified force in NYC educational 
politics, demonstrated a substantial interest in the accountability effort. Sandra Feldman of the UFT 
explained, “We thought we ought to get in and have a voice right at the beginning” (Maeroff, 1974, 
p. 20). Accordingly, the UFT was involved in July 1970 as the accountability committee narrowed its 
choice of design contractors to two finalists, which included Dyer’s ETS proposal that focused on 
the notion of shared school accountability rather than accountability for individual teachers (Anker, 
1970).4 
Ongoing system governance and sociopolitical dynamics, however, virtually ensured 
controversy over just who should and would be involved in determining accountability policy. When 
the first ETS accountability design contract was publicized in spring 1971, for instance, well-known 
African-American psychologist and educator Dr. Kenneth B. Clark protested that the proposed 
system was a “cruel hoax” that would “give sanction to negative expectations for poor and minority-
group children” (Buder, 1971b, p. 25). Clark’s specific concerns were that Dyer’s approach to 
accountability appeared to minimize the importance of assessing student basic skills while 
emphasizing variables such as student socioeconomic background as the central factors for poor 
performance. It also made the school the unit of accountability rather than specific educational 
actors. Clark asserted teachers would essentially escape responsibility for student performance in the 
ETS accountability system.  
Like Clark, other African-American and Latino community members, advocates, and 
educational professionals during this time had generated greater attention to holding teachers and 
administrators responsible for educating urban children (Lewis, 2013). The United Bronx Parents, a 
federally-funded anti-poverty organization, “prepared training materials for parents on school 
evaluation, including the use of comparisons between interschool reading averages” (Wynne, 1972, 
p. 81).  “Would you like to know how your school compares with the rest of the schools in the 
Bronx?” asked one training document (Wynne, 1972, p. 81). In Brooklyn’s Bedford-Stuyvesant 
neighborhood, an African-American community school district superintendent employed an 
accountability system that featured frequent teacher and principal evaluation throughout his network 
of schools (Lewis, 2013). Meanwhile, an African-American principal in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
encouraged parents to visit and inspect instruction in his school during what he called accountability 
days (Lewis, 2013). In these ways,  representatives and leaders from New York City’s underserved 
communities helped promote the idea of increased accountability for professional educators.  
Cognizant of this prevailing atmosphere, and in direct response to Clark’s 1971 critique, 
Chancellor Scribner eventually added five additional minority group representatives to the 
Accountability Committee. One of these individuals was from the Metropolitan Applied Research 
Center [MARC] that Clark headed. In response to Scribner’s actions, the teachers’ and 
administrators’ representatives walked off the Committee (Buder, 1971c). Albert Shanker, the 
president of the UFT, stated the addition of the new members “comes close to destroying” the 
accountability effort, while Walter Degnan, the president of the CSA, explained the Chancellor’s 
decision “will only impede the committee’s progress” (Buder, 1971c, p. 35). The UFT and CSA 
                                                
4 Suggesting an emerging, productive relationship, on September 26, 1970, Dyer delivered a speech to the 
UFT regarding contentious features of accountability. The UFT subsequently transformed the speech into a 
distributable pamphlet, symbolizing an apparent alliance between the teachers’ union and the man charged 
with designing a system that some outside the school system hoped would hold teachers more accountable 
for student academic results (Dyer, 1970a).       
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eventually returned to the group when they were allowed to add additional members as well (No 
Author, n.d.). This episode itself demonstrates how developing the 1970s accountability system was 
subject to the difficulties system leaders faced in attempting to address the concerns of so many 
diverse voices. It also highlights how the BOE’s weak central governance structure impeded the 
swift implementation of reforms that the Chancellor favored.           
Conversely, after 2002, Mayoral control of the schools, enacted by state legislation, 
essentially allowed an elite cadre of school system executives working under Chancellor Joel Klein to 
exercise final decision-making authority over operating policies for the sprawling five borough, 1-
million-student system (Ravitch, 2010; Rogers, 2009). Gyurko and Henig (2010) described how, 
particularly under the initial school governance mode from 2002-2004, “working groups made 
decisions behind closed doors in a manner reminiscent of nineteenth century progressive reformers 
designing a system ‘for the people but not by the people’” (p. 95). Hill (2011) explained that 
Chancellor “Klein’s political strategy required that the DOE avoid the ‘politics of paralysis’ by acting 
fast and avoiding consultations that could only delay actions or dilute results” (p. 29). The resulting 
dynamic produced an “unpolitics,” in which “public deliberation, debate, and contestation were at a 
minimum…because there was a powerful momentum and air of inevitability that made open 
challenge seem fruitless” (Gyurko & Henig, 2010, p. 113).  
Accordingly, accountability system implementation under Klein was relatively swift, 
especially compared to the 1970s effort, although it too was delayed from its initial plan. Planning 
began in 2003, the system was piloted in 2006, and it was implemented in 2007 after multiple starts 
(Gootman & Medina, 2007b; Herszenhorn, 2005).  In December 2003, Klein announced the 
development of an accountability system to start in fall 2004 (Herszenhorn, 2003). James E. Sailer, a 
senior manager at a consulting firm before joining the DOE staff as director of performance 
management, reported that he completed his accountability system design work when he left the 
DOE in July 2004 (Herszenhorn, 2005). Klein again announced the development of an 
accountability system in June 2005, with an intended pilot in 2006 (Herszenhorn, 2005). At least in 
part, the delay in implementation was tactical. Klein acknowledged that he had initiated an array of 
ambitious structural reforms that took precedence. Moreover, the New York State Department of 
Education, spurred by No Child Left Behind requirements, was introducing new tests that would 
require adjustments to any accountability system the city created (Herszenhorn, 2005). In the 
meantime, Klein and his team’s consistent use of accountability rhetoric—especially in regard to 
principals—delivered the message that joining professional responsibility to student performance 
remained a looming administration goal. In addition, the Klein administration retained the power to 
impose reforms essentially at will, which suggested eventual completion of the system was a 
certainty, despite apparent delays. 
At the request of Chancellor Klein, in January 2006 James Liebman, a Columbia University 
legal scholar who specialized in constitutional issues attendant to the death penalty, took leave from 
his university position to lead the accountability design effort (Childress, Higgins, Ishimaru, & 
Takahashi, 2011; Gyurko & Henig, 2010). Liebman reported that he was motivated to “be a part of 
public sector institutional reform through the lens of public education” (Finn, 2007, p. B4), and later 
described his goals as “helping the city shake up the bureaucracy and motivate and empower 
educators to accelerate the learning of all kids” (Miller, 2010, p. 1). Starting the system “from 
scratch,” he underscored, 
The purpose of grading these schools and making those grades public is not because 
we want to give them a whack on the knuckles, it’s to generate pressure to get them 
moving forward, to improve. We’re looking for innovators and problem-solvers 
among our educators, but there has to be accountability. (Finn, 2007, p. B4) 
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Professional consultants such as Sir Michael Blair, who helped reform England’s schools through a 
focus on student achievement and school closures, played an essential role in helping spur New 
York’s accountability thinking during the development and implementation phase (Herszenhorn, 
2006). England-based Cambridge Education, meanwhile, designed and executed the accountability 
system’s Quality Reviews, site-based school visits intended to ensure that all schools worked toward 
exhibiting central-administration-sanctioned educational best practices (Childress, Higgins, Ishimaru, 
& Takahashi, 2011). While the 1970s accountability committee sputtered as it sought to represent 
and satisfy diverse democratic interests, the 2000s accountability team hummed as it accessed 
consultants from a range of professional backgrounds to help develop and implement plans that 
represented unified executive interests.  
Symbolic of this management-minded focus on exclusivity in the name of efficiency, the 
United Federation of Teachers (UFT), unlike in the 1970s, played no discernible role in 
accountability plan development and implementation in the 2000s. In 2003, UFT president Randi 
Weingarten charged that teachers had not been consulted about the emerging accountability ideas, 
which meant that any implemented system would “be looked at with tremendous skepticism” by 
teachers (Herszenhorn, 2003, p. B2). In 2005, Weingarten again asserted that teachers had not been 
invited to provide input into possible accountability plans, and therefore any resulting system would, 
in her words, “be viewed as a weapon against teachers in schools” (Herszenhorn, 2005, p. B3). In 
addition to eschewing teacher participation, the accountability development team under Klein 
appeared to garner traditional public and community input only after the first distribution of school 
grades. Toward that end, in December 2007 Liebman was criticized at a City Council meeting and 
jeered by parents who held up signs with the letter “F” prominently displayed (Medina, 2007). Such 
events help crystallize a central difference in the two different era’s power relations: in the 1970s, 
parents and community members exercised the right to share in school and system decision-making; 
in the 2000s, parents and community members exercised the limited right to boo after central 
administrators made decisions. 
Just as teachers, parents, and community members saw their relative power change in the 
two eras, so did principals, who played visible roles in both accountability efforts. 
Principals 
At the February 1971 press conference announcing the ETS accountability design contract, 
Chancellor Scribner stated, “the finger [of accountability] will not be pointed at any one individual or 
administrator” but rather on “staff performance in the aggregate” (Buder, 1971a, p. 29). In its 
promise of joint accountability without individual consequences, this statement reflected the 
Chancellor’s effort to keep all interested professional parties at the system design table. However, 
from the mid-1960s into the 1970s, African-American and Latino representatives emphasized that 
they expected any accountability system to reward effective educators and, when necessary, remove 
ineffective individuals, whom these advocates deemed responsible for the poor educations children 
from their communities received (Lewis, 2013; Wynne, 1972). In a New York Times editorial, for 
instance, Kenneth B. Clark (1970) emphasized, 
A system of accountability must be maintained to insure that each teacher is 
responsible to his principal or assistant principal for the reading achievement of the 
children in his class. The principal, in turn, must be responsible to the assistant 
superintendent or some other supervisor for the efficient performance of his 
teachers as this is reflected in the academic performance of their students. (p. 63) 
At the outset of the 1970s effort, however, accountability appeared intended to preserve rather than 
challenge the professional status quo. Tellingly, a New York Times photo from the February 1971 
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press conference showed the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) president, the Board of 
Education president, the Chancellor, and the Council of Supervisors and Administrators (CSA) 
president seated side-by-side at a conference table, symbolically united in their quest for joint 
accountability without finger pointing (Buder, 1971a, p. 29).  
After Irving Anker became Chancellor in fall 1973, he helped jump start the accountability 
committee and reinvigorate the quest to have the BOE approve and implement the ETS plan. In 
another step, he publicly identified principals as one class of professional educators whom he 
expected to meet stated educational objectives or face professional consequences, including possible 
removal. As a mechanism toward achieving that end, he introduced a proposed yearly evaluation 
plan in which principals would be assessed on the degree to which they met specific goals during the 
school year (Buder, 1974a). In introducing the initiative, Anker explained the evaluation plan was “a 
highly significant attempt to improve the quality of supervisory practices” (Buder, 1974a, p. 1). The 
headline of a related New York Times story, meanwhile, announced “Principals Face Disciplining 
Under Grading System” (Buder, 1974a, p. 1). The message seemed clear: principals must improve, 
or else.      
At the time, New York City principals, very few of whom were people of color, felt under 
siege from the democratic, sociopolitical forces affecting NYC education generally and their schools 
specifically. Student rights, community control, and parental advocacy had increasingly threatened 
administrators’ school-based authority, while principal tenure was being contested (Peck, 2011; 
SAANYS, n.d.). Moreover, African-Americans, Latinos, and individuals from other traditionally 
excluded groups successfully challenged hiring processes that had privileged Whites for teaching and 
supervisory positions (Collins, 2011). In response to these events, some veteran, tenure-protected 
principals, especially high school principals, became vocal political actors who would stake out 
reactionary postures and regularly protest actions by NYC school system leaders, including the 
Chancellor (Maeroff, 1982). In a widely-publicized act of protest in 1976, a high school principal, 
with the support of parents, barricaded himself in his office for several days in order to defy 
Chancellor Anker’s directive for his removal from the position. The principal eventually benefited 
from a compromise solution devised by multiple parties that allowed him to return to his position. 
These events suggest that principals also engaged in political activism (Peck, 2011).     
In this fashion, some principals and the CSA publicly protested what they viewed as Anker’s 
attempt to impose an accountability measure directed exclusively toward their position. In a letter to 
the New York Times editor, for example, the CSA President Peter O’Brien called the Chancellor’s 
principal evaluation document “an unwieldy and unworkable form” and “a superficial report card 
that cannot improve the schools’ effectiveness” (O’Brien, 1974a, p. 1). By fall 1974, the principal 
evaluation plan was implemented. In a letter, O’Brien advised CSA members to comply with the 
form only partially, filling out only certain sections. In addition, he recommended members write 
objectives as general statements rather than specific, measurable items, essentially subverting the 
intent of the form to structure accountability through attention to concrete goals (O’Brien, 1974b).   
Though it is not clear from available records how many principals followed CSA’s 
suggestions regarding the evaluation plan, the document offers evidence that CSA encouraged its 
members to resist, if not defy the Chancellor’s pursuit of greater accountability. Importantly, though, 
this episode also reflected how principals, by 1974, were viewed as an inviting starting point for 
those concerned with reforming the system through increased professional responsibility for school 
performance. A New York Times editorial from the period, for instance, chided school administrators 
for protesting the evaluation plan, explaining, “the supervisors, who have spoken out so often 
against chaotic conditions resulting from irresponsible students or community actions, cannot afford 
the irresponsibility of undermining the chancellor’s policy of accountability for professional school 
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leadership” (New York Times, 1974, p. 36). By 1982, Chancellor Macchiarola routinely removed and 
replaced principals in a highly visible indictment of the previous systemic culture that “often treated 
high school principals as absolute rulers with lifetime powers over their domains” (Maeroff, 1982, p. 
1).          
By the 2000s, the CSA had fully relinquished principals’ tenure job protections in return for 
higher pay (Wyatt, 1999). Therefore, principals retained little power to protest any changes enacted 
by central administrators as they now functioned as at-will employees without lifetime job 
assurances. In the 2000s, Department of Education (DOE) asserted they “empowered” principals 
since they had provided them with significant site-based discretion over budget allocations and 
personnel hiring. DOE leaders, however, retained fundamental authority to demand principals’ 
attention to particular managerial tasks as well as to define the essential educational outcomes they 
would be asked to meet (Ravitch, 2010; Shipps, 2012). By 2004, principals bore the brunt of the 
Chancellor’s tough public talk and well-publicized personnel actions. After the DOE released the 
names of 45 principals removed for poor performance, Jill S. Levy, the Council of Supervisors and 
Administrators (CSA) president, called Klein the “quintessential model for bullies” and noted, “it is 
not enough that the Chancellor is able to replace 45 principals…he has the need to destroy them 
publicly” (Gootman, 2004, p. B7).  
CSA President Levy’s public complaints did little to stall the Klein administration’s focus on 
principal accountability. In fact, holding principals responsible for student achievement was publicly 
positioned as a focal point of the administration’s new accountability system as it moved toward the 
pilot stage. A front page New York Times headline intoned, “Principals’ Jobs On Line as City Grades 
Schools” (Gootman, 2006, p. A1). However, the reporter explained that “any effort to remove 
principals based on the new grades could require changes in their contract….[since] under the 
current contract, principals are rated satisfactory or unsatisfactory, and critics say even poor 
principals are rarely penalized” (Gootman, 2006, p. A1). CSA President Levy likened the school 
grades to “a sword of Damocles” that would hang over principals (Gootman, 2006, p. B8).       
The evolution of principals as chief accountability targets was complete by the following 
year. Under a new DOE-CSA labor agreement in spring 2007, principals received significantly 
increased pay in return for signing performance contracts focused on their ability to meet targets for 
anticipated student test score growth. The student test score growth would be reflected in their 
school’s letter grade (Herszenhorn, 2007; Shipps, 2012). The agreement also replaced the binary 
satisfactory-unsatisfactory personal evaluation ratings with a more complex spectrum that would 
afford principals’ supervisors with more leverage to force change and improvement. While 
principals’ relinquishment of tenure in 1999 lessened their job protections and made them more 
vulnerable to professional consequences such as removal from their positions (Wyatt, 1999), the 
2007 labor agreement directly tied their professional status to the accountability system. A 
fundamental change in the public dynamic of responsibility for school results was complete. Where 
Chancellor Scribner in 1971 had refused to point the finger of accountability at any single 
educational group, Chancellor Klein in 2007 pointed the finger of accountability squarely at one 
class of professional: the principal. 
PR 
Leaders of the 1970s accountability effort were cognizant of the need to make their 
proposed design understandable and attractive to the public. Minutes from an early Accountability 
Committee meeting demonstrate that the group planned to access print media and television to 
promote the accountability idea (Cooper, 1970). The document explained, “Press releases and 
background information will be prepared for the public at the proper time. Dr. Dyer and our Office 
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of Public Information will collaborate on such announcements” (Cooper, 1970, p. 3). In addition to 
informing the broader public, the accountability committee recognized a need to inform 
constituents of the committee’s different organizations. The minutes concluded,  
A program for selling Accountability [sic] to the clientele in each organization 
represented on the Committee should include consideration of the following: 
1) Involvement of Dr. Dyer in the preparation of a press release. 
2) Use of TV in presenting the program. 
3) Emphasis on our responsibility to get back to membership. 
4) Preparation by Dr. Dyer of public relations material. (Cooper, 1970, pp. 3-4)     
While the accountability committee helped plan and execute key public relations events such as 
Chancellor Scribner’s announcement of the ETS design contract (Buder, 1971a), district 
accountability administrators experienced difficulties in effectively presenting the ETS-designed 
system to the lay public. In 1975, for instance, Board of Education (BOE) member Amelia Ashe 
sent a memorandum to the Accountability Director Charles I. Schonhaut explaining that she had 
“read the minutes of the last Consultative Council meeting and the Parents’ Federation Meeting and 
have had some calls from parents concerning their difficulty with comprehending the accountability 
program.” Her concern was that “I am not sure that your well-prepared presentation was fully 
understood by those present who may lack the background and familiarity with this area.” She 
continued,  
The problem of conveying complex and detailed educational programs to lay people 
is one I myself have often had. It really requires careful examination of audience level 
and a presentation geared to their need and ability. I know how hard that is for those 
of us who are familiar with the sophisticated shorthand of complicated subjects and 
areas to translate to those with lack of familiarity. (Ashe, 1975, p. 1) 
Ashe closed by noting, “If I can be of further assistance, I should be most happy to discuss this 
further” (Ashe, 1975, p. 1). 
Ashe’s pointed advice to Schonhaut suggested the need for more professional management 
of the publicity for the accountability system plan. BOE public relations operations were relatively 
well-funded and well-staffed. A 1977 report stated that $563,444 was budgeted for 25 personnel 
(Dembart, 1978).5 Documents from the BOE’s chief public relations representative, Jerome 
Kovalcik, however, reflected how he had to fight for power and influence. In a series of letters sent 
from 1969 to 1974, Kovalcik, by 1973 formally designated as the Assistant Superintendent in Charge 
of the Office of Public Affairs, consistently argued he should be more involved in Board 
deliberations regarding key issues facing the district. In a January 1971 letter to Chancellor Scribner, 
for instance, he asserted,  
I may be able to help you and the Board when reports and memoranda which you 
send to the Board are considered at informal meetings. However, I cannot do so at 
present time because I do not get copies of them. I sit in the outer circle guessing 
what it is being discussed, without being able at all to offer public or community 
relations counsel as is my responsibility….I respectfully submit that you and the 
Board should seek public relations counsel much the same way as the advice of the 
Secretary and Legal Counsel is sought and heard. (Kovalick, 1971, p. 1) 
                                                
5 Edward Koch, a candidate for New York City mayor in 1977, seized on the public relations budget to 
criticize the Board of Education. He stated the BOE spent “more money on its public image than it does on 
its Office of Educational Performance and Accountability” (Dembart, 1978, p. B3). 
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By February 1974, he argued in a memorandum to Chancellor Irving Anker that the Office of Public 
Affairs be given “the responsibility and authority to utilize” the district’s television and radio stations 
“for public or community relations” (Kovalcik, 1974, p. 1).  
Assistant Superintendent Kovalcik’s requests for more involvement suggest that the role of 
the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) in the Board’s publicity and outreach processes was unsettled. 
Specifically, while the OPA managed various publications produced on behalf of the BOE and had a 
News Bureau, the role that OPA would play in informing and managing external press relations 
remained ill-defined. In response to a proposal from a Board member that an Office of Media 
Communications be established separate from the OPA, Kovalcik explained, “I am not able to 
recommend a sensible or practicable plan for separating press relations from the Office of Public 
Affairs” and that “structural separation per se will not enhance press relations” (Kovalcik, 1975, p. 
1). He also made a series of recommendations, including,  
3. Regularly scheduled and frequent meetings of the Board’s public relations 
committee and any designated Board staff with the head of the News Bureau and me 
to discuss public relations (including press, radio and television) strategies: content, 
techniques, etc. 
4. The inclusion of the [head of the News Bureau] or me in the Chancellor’s daily 
discussions with his immediate staff of contemporary problems, decisions, actions, 
etc. (Kovalcik, 1975, p. 3) 
In the midst of the 1975 accountability system implementation effort, then, the Assistant 
Superintendent of the Office of Public Affairs, presumably the individual most likely to be able to 
promote reforms like the accountability system through effective press relations, was still fighting 
for a place in the Board of Education inner circle.  
By the 2000s, Department of Education (DOE) school leaders benefitted from more 
concentrated and coordinated attention to savvy press relations. According to one report, during the 
Klein administration in 2008, the DOE press office stood at 14 employees who exercised a budget 
of $1.3 million (Green, 2008). This figure stood in stark contrast to the early 1990s; a former BOE 
press secretary from 1990 to 1993 reported that he had a staff of 5, including himself (Green, 2008). 
The 2000s DOE press office also engaged in a concerted effort at message control. For instance, it 
established a seven member “truth squad” that monitored popular education-related websites and 
blogs, and, when necessary, posted responses to correct what they deemed as misinformation or 
inaccuracies (Green, 2008, p. 1). Christopher Cerf, a deputy chancellor who developed the idea, 
explained, “We try to keep track of what people are saying about us, and we respond periodically, 
because we believe in the truth,” while press secretary Eric Cantor stated, “It’s just correcting 
mistakes on a different kind of media” (Green, 2008, p. 1). Sol Stern, a senior fellow at the 
Manhattan Institute, school choice advocate, and long-time observer of the New York City public 
schools, discovered that his City Journal writings were read regularly by the Truth Squad. He 
commented, “It sounds like Orwell’s Ministry of Truth. But I guess I should be flattered that the big 
boss [Klein] monitors my writing” (Green, 2008, p. 2). 
The fact that high-level DOE administrators like Deputy Chancellor Cerf took a vested 
interest in press relations offers a pointed contrast to the 1970s, when the task of who should handle 
BOE press relations was unclear and contested. It seemed clear in the 2000s, press relations were so 
vital that considerations of how to manage media reporting on the schools began at the very top of 
the administrative firmament. For example, in his repeated use of principals as accountability targets 
in the press, Chancellor Joel Klein showcased the media skills of a skilled major 21st century 
organizational leader. In one notable instance, Klein made a phone call to Michael J. Petrilli, a noted 
Thomas B. Fordham Institute educational policy analyst, to discuss information the author posted to 
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the Institute’s online blog. According to DOE press secretary Eric Cantor, Klein “knows Mike 
[Petrilli] well and thinks that Mike completely misunderstood the issue” regarding the DOE’s use of 
a reading curriculum that Petrilli described as “hogwash” and “screwy” (Gootman, 2008, pp. 1-2). 
Petrilli later described Klein as “my personal stalker” (Gootman, 2008, p. 1). On a larger, symbolic 
level, Klein’s phone call, as well as what appeared to be his familiar relationship with the author, 
underscores how, by the 2000s, managing press relations was the business of everyone in the DOE 
administration. The accountability system, unveiled through press accounts emphasizing how 
professional educators such as principals would be held responsible for school performance, became 
an essential part of the DOE’s forceful, agenda-setting media campaign.  
Importantly, the accountability system’s single, user-friendly metric helped to promote the 
program in language easily translatable to the broader public. At a state of the city address, for 
instance, Mayor Bloomberg described the school letter grades simply as, “a better way to hold a 
principal’s feet to the fire” (Bloomberg, 2007, p. 3). In this sense, explaining the substance of the 
school grades mattered less than emphasizing that they were a means to bring accountability to the 
schools. The school grades predated NYC’s later employment of single letter grades to signify 
restaurants’ sanitary level (NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 2011). Whether used 
for ranking schools or steakhouses, the A-F symbol offered a simple, powerful signifier of quality, 
no matter how the signifier was derived. Single letter grades certainly stood in stark contrast to the 
Corrective Action Plans, the public document associated with the 1970s accountability plan.   
Discussion 
In the 1970s, accountability was an incipient policy idea in the United States, and the ETS 
plan for New York City found no fertile ground in which to grow. In the 2000s, standards-based 
accountability was a reigning national policy paradigm (Mehta, 2013), which provided the proper 
environment for the system constructed under Chancellor Klein’s administration to take firm root. 
In addition, better availability of funding, a tight-control power dynamic, principals as inviting 
accountability targets, and savvy media management were significant contextual factors enabling 
2000s accountability implementation. A shorthand checklist for policymakers interested in 
implementing a school accountability system in a large urban school district, then, would include a 
supportive policy paradigm and positive developments in regard to several considerations including 
money, power, principals (or other accountability targets), and PR.    
A particularly important contextual factor in both eras was governance power. The two 
accountability system implementation efforts demonstrated essential differences between a quasi-
democratic, inclusive approach to implementation versus an executive, exclusive approach. The 
1970s effort emerged in an arena where central power was so attenuated that expedited 
implementation was impossible. There were, quite simply, too many constituencies with too many 
different ideas to come to consensus on a viable way forward toward implementing a citywide 
accountability system. Conversely, the 2000s effort showcased how organizational power 
concentrated among an elite few allowed implementation to proceed successfully. In both eras 
consultants were paid and plans were produced, but only in the 2000s was the central 
administration’s power consolidated sufficiently so that an accountability system was implemented 
amidst great media fanfare. One wonders, however, about the long-term effects of an 
implementation strategy based in part on exclusion of so many key, interested parties. If governance 
power shifts in the future, and now that Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein have departed, will 
the accountability system survive?  
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In terms of sociopolitical power, these two cases demonstrate a greatly changed role for 
communities of color in the battles for New York City education. In the 1960s into the 1970s, 
African-American and Latino advocates fought fiercely for the idea that professional educators must 
be held accountable for school performance in their community schools (Lewis, 2013; Perlstein, 
2004; Ravitch, 2000). For individuals like Kenneth B. Clark, a formal school accountability system’s 
design and, as importantly, who designed it, were crucial issues open to protest and dispute. In the 
2000s, such community advocates were largely relegated to the sideline as policy elites imposed their 
own particular form of bureaucratic accountability on the schools. Chancellor Klein administration’s 
approach to accountability system implementation proved successful, but it also begs the question: 
in a democratic nation, what are the costs of running public schools in ways that essentially 
minimize local community input? 
Turning to a principle drawn from scholarship regarding the history of educational reform, 
the two quests, separated by roughly three decades, to create an accountability system in New York 
City underscore the notion that reform ideas do indeed return—even if in different arrangements 
(Cuban, 1990; Hess, 2010). Though not within the provenance of this study, the intervening time 
between the 1970s and 2000s effort was marked by repeated calls, successful steps, and failed 
missteps toward increased school accountability in New York City. For thirty years, then, members 
of the New York City professional educator classes as well as the communities the schools serve 
considered the proper place and role of “accountability.” The idea that someone, somewhere can, 
must, and will be held responsible for a student’s academic performance is a reform idea that has 
emerged “again, again, and again” (Cuban, 1990, p. 3) in the New York City schools. 
Finally, much as Lipman (2002) and Mazzeo (2001) found, symbolic politics suffused each 
of the two accountability efforts. Signifying democratic involvement, in 1971 Chancellor Scribner 
invited more stakeholder representatives to his Accountability Committee when complaints 
emerged. Contrastingly, Chancellor Klein’s actions symbolized corporate-style prioritization of 
deeds over deliberation when he hired an accountability chief in 2006; the accountability chief in 
turn enacted an accountability system fully in 2007. Similarly, teachers’ and principals’ public 
protests against professional accountability in the 1970s signaled two Chancellors’ relative impotence 
to take decisive action within their professional domain. In this way, Chancellors Scribner and Anker 
seemed less supervisors of the organization than subjects to its whims. In 2004, conversely, media 
reports regarding Chancellor Klein’s removal of principals for poor performance symbolized a 
Chancellor’s forceful initial efforts to bring accountability to the system. In media accounts, he was 
depicted as a strong leader taking tough, urgent action against deficient educators.   
Conclusion 
In the 1970s, a politically appointed Board of Education and two Chancellors undertook 
ambitious efforts to develop and implement an accountability system in the New York City public 
schools. Inclusive development efforts, represented by an Accountability Committee, failed to 
produce system implementation. Thirty years later, the Department of Education (DOE) under 
control of the Mayor and his hand-selected Chancellor again undertook ambitious efforts to devise 
and implement an accountability system in the New York City public schools. Against the backdrop 
of a fully matured national educational accountability policy paradigm, closed-ranks DOE 
accountability system design efforts led directly to implementation. Moreover, positive conditions in 
relation to four contextual factors (money, power, principals, and PR) proved pivotal in enabling 
implementation success in the 2000s. 
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This study helps enrich and deepen our understanding of the interplay between policy 
paradigms and contextual factors, and demonstrates how these forces affect the implementation of 
educational accountability policy. In the case of New York City, the 1970s effort suffered from the 
fact that accountability, as an inchoate policy idea, engendered debates over what constituted 
suitable assessment measures as well as who should be held accountable for educational results. In 
the 2000s, holding professional educators responsible for student academic performance via test 
score outcomes was an accepted, commonplace reform idea, a fact which helped ease 
implementation of the new accountability system in New York City. Importantly, though, the role of 
several contextual factors in enabling system implementation was clear. For instance, whereas the 
1970s effort lacked access to sufficient funding, the 2000s effort benefited from a strong city budget 
and substantial outside philanthropic support. In the end, the reigning policy paradigm certainly 
mattered in determining accountability implementation success or failure, but so did the contextual 
factors of money, power, principals, and public relations. Even with the policy paradigm in place, 
negative conditions in just one of the contextual factors may have complicated or even doomed 
system implementation. For example, it seems fair to speculate: would the accountability system 
have been developed and implemented successfully in the adverse budgetary climate that resulted 
after the Great Recession of 2008? Or, since a New York state school accountability system already 
existed to assess the City’s schools, would a New York City-specific accountability system have been 
deemed a luxury item that was too expensive to purchase during troubled economic times?    
This study also helps illuminate the neglected topic of how and why accountability first 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. While Mehta (2013) described the 1970s as a time when 
establishing bureaucratic accountability mechanisms was predominantly the concern of state 
departments of education, major cities like New York City also pursued educational improvement 
through accountability systems. Furthermore, Dr. Kenneth B. Clark’s integral role in the 
development of accountability systems in both Washington, D.C. and New York City suggests how 
African-Americans in particular played an important though underappreciated role in supporting 
educational accountability system development in the 1970s. In the state department of education in 
Michigan, for example, African-American educational leaders like John Porter and Ronald Edmonds 
(whose work eventually helped spark the Effective Schools Movement) led the way in developing a 
“six-step accountability model” (Mehta, 2013, p. 80). In the 1960s and 1970s, African-American 
urban school leader Marcus Foster utilized accountability in his efforts to improve schools in 
Philadelphia and Oakland (Spencer, 2012). Spencer (2012) explained, “the emphasis on academic 
achievement and accountability in our [contemporary] era is…in part—a legacy [italics original] of the 
black freedom movement” (p. 188).6 African-Americans and members of other underserved 
populations in urban areas, then, proved essential to the early gestation of educational accountability 
as a preferred school reform approach. In the 2000s, however, community members, parents, and 
civic leaders from underserved populations were essentially ignored in an accountability system 
development and implementation process tightly controlled by DOE central administration. One 
wonders what long-term democratic costs to urban schools, communities, and students such an 
exclusionary approach exacted.  
Finally, events in New York City demonstrate the possible political value of accountability, 
specifically in the symbolic frame it generates in which elected officials hold educators responsible 
                                                
6 Spencer (2012) argued, however, that present-day accountability overly focuses on holding educators 
responsible for academic outcomes, and neglects attention to broader socioeconomic factors that affect urban 
children and the communities in which they live. Marcus Foster, for example, had advocated for community 
engagement and shared accountability. 
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for student academic results. In the 2000s, Mayor Bloomberg was elected in part to transform a 
school district perceived as corrupt, dysfunctional, and incapacitated. In media depictions, the new 
educational accountability system came to signify gutsy leadership willing to hold a “principal’s feet 
to the fire” in order to ensure a great education for New York City’s children (Bloomberg, 2007, p. 
3). Moreover, when the Mayor ran for re-election in fall 2009, the fact that 97% of the elementary 
and middle schools received an A or B in the grading system that Chancellor Klein’s administration 
put into operation two years previously helped support the Mayor’s consistent public message that 
the school system had improved under his watch (Medina & Gebeloff, 2009). It seems that an 
accountability system implemented as a means to improve teaching and learning for students also 
provided benefits for the adults tasked with reforming the New York City public schools. Such are 
the potential political profits afforded by school accountability system implementation. 
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